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THE TRUTH ABOUT THE JAMESON RAID

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE JAMESON RAID

By

JOHN HAYS HAMMOND

AS RELATED TO

ALLEYNE IRELAND

BOSTON

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Preface

THE contents of this volume appeared in the August and September numbers of the "North American Review," 1918.

Following their publication I received so many requests that a more permanent form should be given to the material that I have had this little volume issued.

I wish to express my indebtedness to His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons, to the Hon. William H. Taft, to the Hon. E. M. House, to President Arthur T. Hadley, and to the Hon. Oscar S. Straus, for their permission to print the letters which they have been good enough to send me in regard to "The Truth About the Jameson Raid."

I take the occasion also to acknowledge the courtesy of the "North American Review" in allowing the republication of the articles.

JOHN HAYS HAMMOND.

October, 1918.

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Washington, D. C., Oct. 24, 1918.

My dear Mr. Hammond: —

I am very glad to hear that your clear, calm, and moderate statement of the injustice and outrage of the Kruger Government is to be published in a form which will reach the people of the United States.

It is of the utmost importance to show the real ground for the action of England in fighting the Boer War and in producing the present condition of prosperity, happiness, and loyalty of the Boer people.

It is well to have the facts clearly brought out to show the attitude of Germany, which was of a piece with her foreign policy before and since, and the high purpose of those who were the first movers towards the freedom of the Transvaal, and whose course is eminently justified by the result.

Yours very sincerely,

WM. H. TAFT.

Cardinal's Residence, 408 N. Charles St.,
Baltimore, Oct. 16, 1918.

Dear Mr. Hammond: —

In these days when History is being made so fast your booklet "The Truth About the Jameson Raid" will be appreciated by students who are investigating the intrigues which flourished in so many parts of the world previous to the World War, and which have been looked upon as part of the preparation for the present struggle to secure world domination by the Central Powers.

Faithfully yours,

J. CARD. GIBBONS,
Archbishop of Baltimore.

Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
President's Office, Oct. 4, 1918.

My dear Mr. Hammond: —

The articles on "The True Story of the Jameson Raid," which Mr. Ireland has written on the basis of information which you have furnished, are of extraordinary interest. They throw light, not only on the circumstances which preceded and followed the raid itself, but also on the character of President Kruger's policy, and indirectly also on the international policy of Germany as a whole. This last aspect of the matter gives them renewed interest today. It is one of the many pieces of history which throw light on the attempt of the German emperor to establish a new world hegemony, if not an actual world empire; and you have done good service in contributing the testimony of an eye witness to this chapter of history.

Very sincerely,
(Signed) ARTHUR T. HADLEY.

New York City, Sept. 5, 1918.

My dear Mr. Hammond: —

I want to say how much I enjoyed reading, in the "North American Review," your "True Story of the Jameson Raid." It is most interesting and most informing, and you have rendered a distinct service in clarifying this important incident in international relationship. I say a "distinct service" because the general impression so far as this country is concerned was detrimental to British fair play.

Your graphic statement of this affair, in which you took so important a part, furnishes an additional evi-

dence of the Kaiser's unconscionable methods and of the German kultur of fraud and perversion.

I hope that these articles will be further distributed in book form, not only in this country but in Great Britain.

Sincerely yours,

Oscar S. Straus.

New York City, Oct. 11, 1918.

Dear Mr. Hammond:—

I am glad that you are giving to the public "The True Story of the Jameson Raid."

It was one of the most dramatic incidents in history, and its consequences have been of such far-reaching importance that the world will be eager to know the facts.

Sincerely yours,

E. M. House.

The Truth About the Jameson Raid

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JOHN HAYS HAMMOND
AS RELATED TO
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THE amazing revelations of German intrigue which within the past few months have come from points as far apart as Buenos Aires and Constantinople, as Petrograd and Tokyo, have stirred in my memory the recollection of a certain telegram signed by the same William, King of Prussia and German Emperor, whose impudent and mendacious emissaries have set the mark of indelible infamy on the brow of their Imperial accomplice.

"From Wilhelm, Imperator, Rex, Berlin: to President Kruger, Pretoria, South African Republic," so ran the address, and thus the message:

I tender you my sincere congratulations that without appealing to the help of friendly Powers you and your people have been success-

ful in opposing with your own forces the armed bands that have broken into your country to disturb the peace, in restoring order, and in maintaining the independence of your country against attacks from without.

Like many of the German documents which have recently come to light, this message is clothed in language which imparts to it a flavor of innocence and of sympathy. It is not until the surrounding circumstances are carefully examined that the telegram can be assigned its proper place in the dark record of German diplomacy.

American citizens played a prominent part in the events referred to in the Kaiser's telegram, and the account of an eye-witness may prove of more than passing interest at this time. The story carries the reader to South Africa, where, in the heart of a pastoral country, nature has buried thousands of feet below the sunburnt plain the world's greatest store of gold.

I may begin my narrative with a meeting held by five hundred Americans in Johannesburg, the mining city of the Transvaal, in December, 1895. What we had met to decide was whether or not we should give

our support to a Revolution which was then brewing against the Boer oligarchy.

I was a little late in getting there and, when I entered, the meeting was in disorder. Some of President Kruger's spies had managed to gain admittance, and the disturbance they made was so great that the Chairman, Captain Mein — an American and manager of the celebrated Robinson mine — was about to announce an adjournment. I walked rapidly up the aisle, mounted the platform, and secured a hearing. I told the rowdies that if they made any more trouble I'd have them thrown out. Then I explained the exact situation which confronted us.

Our grievances were so well known that there was no need for me to enlarge upon them; all I had to do was to take the sense of those present — and every class of American was represented — on the single question whether the point had not been reached to which the signers of the Declaration of Independence referred when they said:

> . . . all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and

usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

Nothing is to be found in the Declaration of Independence limiting this principle by latitude, by longitude, or by circumstance: it was a clean-cut hereditary issue, to be faced by us Americans then and there.

The efforts of President Kruger's secret agents, among whom there were many Germans, had been directed for a long time to heading off the Revolution by sowing dissension in the ranks of the mining community, and there was some danger that these attempts might succeed. The ingenious plan was followed of telling the American and other non-British immigrants that the whole affair was nothing but an English plot to induce us to spend our money and to shed our blood in order that the country should be brought under the British flag.

For the Americans the whole thing hung on the question of the flag; and I knew very well that there was but one way to secure

American support for the Revolution and at the same time to establish our action as a genuine internal revolt having no object ulterior to that of destroying the narrow Boer oligarchy, then at the height of its malign and corrupt power, and of setting up in its place a truly representative democracy on the American model. So I made it clear that if the worst came to the worst and we were driven to resort to violence, it was under the Boer flag that we would fight, and that we should have at least the sympathy of many progressive young Boers who were as disgusted as we were with the infamous condition into which the country had been brought by Paul Kruger and his Dutch and German satellites, and had declared that they would not bear arms against the Johannesburgers if the city were attacked.

I concluded my speech by saying, "I will shoot any man who hoists any flag but the Boer flag," an announcement which was vigorously applauded. Out of more than five hundred Americans present all but five voted to take up arms against Kruger; and immediately on the adjournment of the meeting we organized the George Wash-

ington Corps and pledged ourselves to the Revolutionary cause.

What the Revolution was about, how it failed, how the leaders, including myself, were sentenced to death, how the death-penalty was commuted, how our point of view was vindicated by the Boer War and by England's measures after the country came under the British flag is what I purpose to tell in the following pages.

When news of the Jameson Raid appeared in thousands of papers in all parts of the world on Tuesday, December 31, 1895, the general impression was created that a swashbuckling Englishman had attempted to overthrow the Government of the South African Republic in order to add its territory to the British Empire. It was not unnatural that this view of the situation should have aroused a widespread feeling of indignation, and that an almost unanimous expression of sympathy with the Boers should have marked the press comment in the United States and on the Continent of Europe.

The outbreak of the South African War four years later revived in the public memory the forgotten incident of the Raid,

furnished prejudice or ignorance with fresh material for an anti-British propaganda, gave to pro-Boer sentiment a new and vigorous lease of life, and confirmed in their opinion those who had seen in the Jameson Raid nothing but a brutal act of aggressive imperialism.

Nothing could be more grotesque than the effort which was made to interpret the Johannesburg reform movement—of which the Jameson Raid was no more than a deplorable incident—as an expression of England's imperial policy. It was not the enlightened imperialism of England but the benighted provincialism of Kruger which created in South Africa that profound discontent, that bitter sense of injustice which drove the population of Johannesburg to seek through the agency of an internal revolution those simple, democratic rights which had been denied alike to their respectful petitions and to their constitutional protests.

As I was one of the four members of the Reform Committee sentenced to death by Kruger's specially imported "hanging judge," Gregorowski, it will be readily believed that I retain a very lively recol-

lection of those exciting times. Where my memory flags I can fortunately refresh it by reference to my wife's little volume, "A Woman's Part in a Revolution"—a diary unfaithful only when its authoress fails to record the unwavering support and the devoted efforts which she brought to the aid and comfort of us Americans during events which might well have unnerved a woman who was soon to become a mother.

I went out to South Africa in 1893 as consulting engineer to the firm of Barnato Brothers, one of the largest mine-owners in the Transvaal; but within a year Mr. Cecil Rhodes, at that time Prime Minister of Cape Colony, offered me a position of wider scope and interest in connection with the general development of the mineral deposits in Rhodesia controlled by the British South Africa Company, and the mines at Johannesburg of the Goldfields of South Africa, of which he was the Managing Director and the moving spirit. This offer I was glad to accept, as I knew Rhodes to be a man of large views and progressive methods; and his reputation, great as it was throughout the British Empire, was in nothing greater than in the staunch backing

he afforded to men who earned his confidence.

My early work in the Transvaal was such as falls to the lot of any consulting engineer in the gold-fields; and I was too busy investigating the practicability of deep-level mining — a possibility then generally regarded as too remote for serious consideration — to pay any attention to local political conditions. But as my field of observation broadened and my daily routine gave me an increasing familiarity with the economic problems of gold-mining in the Transvaal the conviction was forced upon me that the difficulties which the industry faced were not due to any of those technical obstacles which engineers are employed to overcome but to obstructions deliberately placed in the way of the mining community by the Boer Government.

The circumstances cannot be rightly understood unless the reader has before him certain fundamental facts about the capitalists, the mining population, and the Boers — the chief groups concerned in the brief but dramatic occurrences which involved a large body of Americans in an abortive revolution on the other side of the globe.

The idea that "capitalist" and "rascal" are interchangeable terms is one originally advanced by the anarchists, later taken by the I. W. W., and since 1912 sedulously employed by many blatant politicians in the United States. The question addressed to capitalists seeking protection from the American Government for their legitimate business interests in Mexico has been: "What are you doing down there? No one asked you to go there; and if you don't like it, why don't you get out? You're only down there to make money anyhow."

The same question was asked the capitalists who provided the money which raised the Transvaal from the position of a bankrupt State, dependent upon cattle-grazing and primitive agriculture, to that of a wealthy country entering with every prospect of success upon a career of modern development.

Leaving on one side the broad issue between those who describe as honest and praiseworthy and those who stigmatize as dishonest and contemptible the employment of capital to make the world's resources available for the world's use, the case of the Transvaal is peculiar in this,

that President Kruger issued a formal, public invitation to English capitalists, in which he urged them to come to his country and invest their money in its development, promising them in return the protection of their interests, and a fair influence in the government. It was this invitation, published in the London press in 1884, which overcame the reluctance of English capital, after the Boer War of 1881, to seek employment in the Transvaal.

It is a common delusion that capitalists find something peculiarly attractive in war. This charge may be true when it is applied to the manufacturers of war material; but a moment's reflection should suffice to convince any intelligent man that disorder, destruction, and financial panic — the inseparable companions of armed conflict — are the very things of which capital in general is most afraid; in fact, the timidity of capital has become proverbial.

My work during the past thirty years has brought me in contact with many of the world's largest capitalists — American, English, French, Dutch, Belgian, Canadian, Australian, and German — and upon my advice many millions of dollars have

been invested in a score of countries. I can testify that, so far as my own experience goes, I have never met a capitalist whose attitude towards war was not that of the average man, namely, that it was the last and most desperate expedient for the remedy of intolerable abuses. To this rule the capitalists of the Transvaal were no exceptions; and it was only when long-continued misgovernment had been crowned by an open challenge from the Boers to rise and fight for our rights if we thought they were worth it, it was not until President Kruger had declared that the reforms we had petitioned for would be granted only over his dead body, that the mine-owners began to turn their thoughts in the direction of revolt.

The character of the mining population of Johannesburg has been misunderstood when it has not been deliberately misrepresented. The popular American conception of a new mining community is largely based upon our recollection of Bret Harte's heroes. For an imaginative and sensation-loving people it was both easy and agreeable to transfer to South Africa the wild life of Red Gulch and to fill the stage with

a lawless and violent mob which, in the intervals between working their claims and murdering one another, found time to drink, to gamble and, occasionally, to sleep.

Nothing could be less like the humdrum routine of the Rand. Johannesburg was much more like a wealthy manufacturing town than a traditional mining camp. There were, indeed, no miners, as the word was understood out West in the fifties; and our gold mines could be described with greater accuracy as gold factories. The personnel of the mines consisted of a few dozen mining engineers, a few score highly skilled mechanics, a few hundred white miners — chiefly American, Scotch, Welsh, and Cornish — and many thousands of Kaffir laborers.

The life was such as might be found in hundreds of long-settled communities in the Eastern States. Bankers, business men, mining engineers, physicians, surgeons, with their wives and children, made up the "society" of the place; and as these professional men, but especially the mining engineers, were of the highest standing in their several fields, and received munificent

salaries, our social existence lacked neither elegance nor culture. What lent an additional charm to our leisure was the constant stream of distinguished visitors which passed through the town. It was not a mere question of "Little Lords looking for Big Game"—to quote my wife's phrase—but of statesmen, scientists, authors, explorers, colonial administrators, on their way to or from Europe, America, India, Australia, China, the Cape, and Rhodesia.

Mrs. Hammond and I are agreed that neither in London nor in Paris, neither in New York nor in Washington, have we found a social life which better deserved the praise of being brilliant. It was a brilliance, too, which owed everything to the personalties of the men and women and nothing to the extraneous elements of pomp and circumstance.

Before passing to another subject I wish to lay particular emphasis on the fact that from the richest capitalist to the well-paid mechanic the white population was a domestic group, living not in bachelor's quarters but in homes.

The population of the Transvaal was, at the time of which I speak, made up of about

750,000 blacks and about 250,000 whites, the Boers numbering not more than 75,000. In the hands of the Boers—that is to say, in the hands of less than one-tenth of the population—was concentrated the whole power of the government, and all political rights. The real situation in the "Republic" centered around the circumstance that 75,000 Boers, paying one-tenth of the taxes, exercised a complete and exclusive sway over 175,000 white immigrants, who paid nine-tenths of the taxes without having a word to say as to how taxation should be levied or its proceeds expended.

The Boers were by no means of one mind as to the justice or the expediency of this system. On the one side was a large majority of the Boers (the reactionary or *dopper* party), with Paul Kruger at its head, which held very tenaciously to the view that having, by fair promises, attracted to the country an immense flow of capital, and this capital being invested in immovable property, such as land, buildings and machinery, it was unnecessary to fulfill pledges made to a population which could leave the country only at the price of financial ruin,

and which, in order to avoid that ruin, would remain and submit to any degree of oppression and misrule.

On the other side was a small minority, headed by General Joubert. The attitude of this minority was faithfully represented in a speech made before the Upper Chamber of the Transvaal Legislature in August, 1895, by a Mr. Jeppe, a Boer. The occasion was the presentation of a Petition signed by 35,483 Uitlanders (the name given by the Boers to the immigrant population) praying that political representation might be granted to them. In the course of his speech Mr. Jeppe said:

This petition has been, practically, signed by the entire population of the Rand. It contains the name of the millionaire capitalist on the same page as that of the miner, that of the owner of half a district next to that of a clerk. It embraces also all nationalities. And it bears, too, the signatures of some who have been born in this country, who know no other fatherland than this Republic, but whom the law regards as strangers. Then, too, are the newcomers. They have settled for good. They have built Johannesburg, one of the wonders of the age. They own half the soil, they pay at least three-quarters of the taxes. Nor are they persons who belong to a subservient race.

They come from countries where they freely exercised political rights, which can never be long denied to free-born men.

Dare we refer them to the present law, which first expects them to wait for fourteen years, and even then pledges itself to nothing? It is a law which denies all rights even to their children born in this country. What will become of us or our children on the day when we shall find ourselves in a minority of perhaps one in twenty, without a single friend amongst the other nineteen, among those who will then tell us they wished to be brothers, but we by our own act made them strangers in the Republic. Old as the world is, has any attempt like ours ever succeeded for long?

The foregoing statement by a Boer member of the Boer Legislature presents only the political side of the Uitlander case, and it must be supplemented by a recital of the grievances out of which the political agitation arose. It is essential that the reader should understand that the Reform movement in the Transvaal was the direct outcome of the conviction that so long as the whole political and administrative machinery of the country was controlled by the Boers no remedy would be found for the abuses from which we suffered.

I am positive that if Kruger had been

content to give Johannesburg decent government the demand for political rights would have been postponed for many years and, indeed, might never have been made. Nor was it a question of a number of Britishers using the grievances as an excuse for bringing the country under the British flag, for there was a large number of Americans on the spot, who at no time could have had much sympathy with such a programme, and who, on account of the recent trouble between England and the United States over the Venezuelan boundary, were strongly averse to giving the Reform movement an exclusively English complexion.

Our grievances may thus be summarized; and they must be interpreted in the light of the fact that the Uitlanders had purchased from the Boers more than one-half of the land of the Transvaal, that they owned more than nine-tenths of the property, that they paid more than nine-tenths of all the taxes raised in the country, and that in spite of the squandering of its revenues the Transvaal Government had accumulated in its Treasury more than six millions of dollars.

1. We suffered from a high death-rate

and from much sickness through the lack of a sewage system and of a clean water supply.

2. Out of $310,000 allotted in Johannesburg for education less than $4,000 was applied to the Uitlander children, although they outnumbered the Boer children in the town, and their parents supplied the money which built the schools and supported them. The actual figures worked out at about fifty cents a head for our children and $40 a head for the Boer children; and at that, our children were not allowed to use or study English in the schools. This caused the deepest resentment, for our children heard no language but Dutch in the schools, and they were being gradually estranged from the ideals which have been perpetuated by English speech.

3. Although we had built the city and found practically all the money to run it, we had no voice whatever in its government, were dominated by a corrupt and violent Boer police, and were denied a free press and the right of public meeting.

4. The mining industry was harassed by Government monopolies which forced up the cost of living and of working the mines,

and which were farmed out with the object of filling the pockets of Kruger's favorites. Of these monopolies one of the most burdensome was that which compelled us to purchase our dynamite from a single privileged firm, which paid a royalty to certain members of the Transvaal Government. Not only were we forced to pay about three million dollars a year tribute in the form of excess profits to the holder of the monopoly, but the quality of the dynamite was so poor that fatal accidents were of common occurrence.

5. The railroad policy of the Transvaal was so framed as to enable the railroad monopoly to charge extortionate freight rates. Johannesburg was connected with the Cape Colony-Free State railroad, over which most of our supplies came, by a line fifty miles long under the control of the Netherlands South Africa Railway Company, whose shareholders were entirely German, Dutch, and Boer. So high was the freight schedule on this line that it was cheaper for us to unload our consignments at railhead of the Cape Line, re-load them into ox-wagons, and so take them to Johannesburg across the drifts, or fords, by which

alone the Vaal River could be crossed. In order to deprive us of this means of getting ourselves out of the clutches of his railroad monopoly, Kruger closed the drifts on October 1, 1895. But in doing this he over-reached himself. His action was in clear defiance of his treaty obligations to England; and after consultation with the Government of Cape Colony (which pledged itself to support England with men and money if it became necessary to enforce her treaty rights) the British Government informed Pretoria that the drifts must be reopened and must remain open. In response to this ultimatum Kruger rescinded his order.

6. In the interest of the liquor monopoly the Boer Government allowed an unlimited amount of cheap and fiery spirits to be sold to the Kaffirs. There was, in consequence, a great deal of drunkenness among our laborers; and as the liquor dealers were allowed to sell this wretched stuff at the mouth of the mines to men about to go down the shafts, there was much loss of life and of property from this cause.

7. President Kruger and his Executive Council exerted a constant pressure upon

the judges of the Transvaal Supreme Court, the only barrier which stood between the Johannesburgers and the rule of an unbridled despotism. In 1897 the condition became so scandalous that the Boer judges themselves closed the court, declaring that it was impossible to administer justice under the coercion to which they were subjected by the executive.

8. The Boers asserted the right to draft for service in their wars against the natives those very Americans to whom they denied the right of citizenship. It was through a little ruse on my part that this right to conscript Americans was never enforced. I called a meeting one night to which I invited the managers and other American officials of the mines under my management. The meeting was supposed to be a secret one, but we took care to have present an American whom we knew to be a paid spy of the Boer Government. We passed a unanimous resolution that we would resist all efforts of the Boers to send us to the front to fight the Kaffirs, and that if, in face of our protests, we were drafted, our first shots would be fired at the Boer officers. This resolution was duly reported by the

contemptible American spy, and no effort was ever made to conscript us. In this we were more fortunate than the British, of whom a number were forced into the Boer Army.

To this brief survey of our grievances I must add a few words about a man whose cultivated mind and legal talents were employed by Kruger to furnish the finesse which was entirely foreign to his own character. The agreeable but sinister personality of Dr. Leyds, the Transvaal State Attorney, was almost as well known as that of his Boer master. I mention him here because it was a matter of common knowledge that he was the go-between of Kruger and the Kaiser. On January 27, 1895, Kruger, speaking at a banquet in honor of the Kaiser's birthday, said: "I shall ever promote the interests of Germany . . . the time has come to knit ties of the closest friendship between Germany and the South African Republic."

Shortly after this Dr. Leyds went to Berlin—to have his throat examined!—and he was in Berlin when the Kaiser sent the telegram of which I have already spoken.

That part of the Kaiser-Kruger plot which related to keeping the Uitlanders in a state of simmering revolt, Dr. Leyds handled with skill and success. The other part, Germany's proposal to send troops to the Transvaal at the time of the Jameson Raid, went to pieces when England mobilized her flying squadron after the publication of the Kaiser-Kruger telegram. Kruger never forgave the Kaiser for this back-down. He confided to a friend the opinion that there was no profit in dealing with a monarch who allowed his foreign policy to be dictated by his grandmother.

During 1895 general conditions in the Transvaal went from bad to worse. The Boers became ever more arbitrary and overbearing; and their intentions showed up very clearly when they began to construct forts dominating the city of Johannesburg. One deputation after another was sent to Kruger to state our grievances, but without effect. Finally he told one deputation that he would make no promises of any kind, and he brought the interview to a close by saying: "If you want your grievances redressed, why don't you get guns and fight for what you call your rights?"

We took him at his word.

This brings me to the story of the Jameson Raid, an episode about which there has always been much confusion in the public mind. The reason why the full facts were not brought to light by the two official investigations of the circumstances — one held in Cape Town and the other in London — was that one of the conditions on which the four leaders of the Johannesburg end of the affair, and others arrested at that time, had their death sentences commuted, was a solemn pledge to the Boer Government that for three years they would remain silent upon all questions relating to Transvaal politics. Before this pledge had expired, all interest in the Raid had been swamped by the outbreak of the South African War, and in the meantime the Boers had spent hundreds of thousands of dollars (British and American dollars) in a world-wide propaganda of misrepresentation.

As soon as it became clear that an internal Revolution offered the only way out of our difficulties, a secret Committee was formed for the purpose of securing arms and of working out the details of our plan. This

Committee consisted of Colonel Frank Rhodes — a brother of Cecil Rhodes, and one of the noblest men I have ever met — Lionel Phillips, Percy FitzPatrick, Wools-Sampson, George Farrar, and myself.

Our general scheme was to get some thousands of guns into Johannesburg, and then, on some dark night, to take Pretoria, the Boer Capital about thirty-five miles north of Johannesburg, seize the arsenal, carry Kruger off with us, and to negotiate at leisure for the redress of our grievances and for those constitutional changes which would make the Transvaal a Republic based upon a reasonable franchise law applicable to all its white inhabitants. Among the tasks allotted to me was to arrange for the importation of arms, for the taking of Pretoria and the capture of Kruger.

In view of what actually happened, this sounds like a very wild undertaking; but I am satisfied that if it had not been for the premature movement of Dr. Jameson's force (which I will describe later) we would have had a successful and bloodless Revolution, and that the Union of South Africa would have been formed without

the fighting of the Boer War and without the Transvaal and the Orange Free State passing under the British flag.

Everything was in our favor. The Uitlanders outnumbered the Boers, the project of overawing Johannesburg by the construction of modern forts commanding the town was only in its initial stages, we had the sympathy of a considerable proportion of the younger burghers, and the mining capitalists who had hitherto frowned upon every suggestion of revolt had come round to our point of view and were ready to finance the Revolution.

Two things were considered absolutely necessary for the carrying out of our aims. One was the importation of arms, the other was some arrangement which would insure the safety of our women and children if anything went wrong and there was a prospect of heavy fighting in Johannesburg.

The first of these matters was easy to arrange but slow in execution, for the guns had to be smuggled in a few at a time; the second required the greatest care and presented the greatest difficulties.

Our arms and ammunition were smuggled in by a small group of Americans, of

whom the most active were Mr. Gardner Williams, manager of the famous De Beers diamond mines at Kimberley; Mr. Labram, a mining engineer of a deservedly high reputation, and myself. They were imported from Europe, consigned to Kimberley, and were then sent by rail to Johannesburg concealed in oil tanks or in coal trucks.

After much anxious thought and many long discussions, a plan was arranged between Cecil Rhodes, Dr. Jameson (administrator of the Chartered Company's territories bordering the Transvaal on the west), and the members of the secret committee, whose names I have given above.

Rhodes, as virtual dictator of the Chartered Company, was to order Jameson to concentrate on the border a force of 1,500 mounted men, fully equipped, ready to ride into Johannesburg if and when called upon. A letter was given to Jameson by the reform leaders, explaining the conditions under which the revolutionary plot had originated. It contained the following sentence: "It is under these circumstances that we feel constrained to call upon you to come to our aid, should a disturbance arise here."

This letter was left undated, and it was agreed that it was to be used only for the purpose of justifying Jameson in the eyes of his directors and of the British authorities, if he should actually enter the Transvaal, *and that he should on no account cross the border unless and until he had received from me (as representing Rhodes on the one hand, and the Johannesburg Committee on the other) a specific request to come in.* Of all the scenes of that period none is more clearly imprinted on my memory than that of Jameson shaking hands with me in the presence of Rhodes as a solemn pledge that he would not cross the border until I gave him the signal.

The exaction of this promise was based on two considerations: First, that the appeal to Jameson should come from a population already in a state of active Revolution; second, that as we on the spot could alone judge of the exact moment best suited for the rising, so we alone could determine the need for Jameson's entry and the hour when it should occur. Several tentative dates were fixed for the revolt, but these had in turn to be postponed on account of the slowness with which our arms were

being smuggled in. About the middle of December, 1895, messages began to arrive from Jameson showing that the delay was getting on his nerves, and by Christmas Day we had become so alarmed by the possibility that Jameson might get out of hand that we sent two men, by different routes, each of whom delivered to him our emphatic protest against any unauthorized move by him; and he was warned both from Cape Town and from Johannesburg that if he disregarded his instructions we should all be involved in disaster.

In the meantime, the Boers began to suspect that something was on foot. On December 28 President Kruger received a deputation of Americans. Among them was Mr. Hennen Jennings, the distinguished mining engineer, who, though he was as anxious as the rest of us to secure reforms, was not convinced that peaceful means had been exhausted. Kruger asked the deputation:

"If a crisis should occur, on which side shall I find the Americans?"

"On the side of liberty and good government," was the answer.

"You are all alike," shouted Kruger,

"tarred with the same brush; you are British in your hearts."

On Monday, December 30, I was sitting in my office in the Goldfields Building, the headquarters of the Reform Committee, when I received a visit from one of Kruger's intimate associates, a man named Sammy Marks, for some of whose enterprises I was consulting engineer. He was nervous and excited, and began immediately to discuss the rumors abroad. After we had talked for some time on the general situation, the door opened and a clerk came in and handed me a slip of paper. On it was written, "Jameson has crossed the border." I was thunderstruck. I can only be thankful that Sammy Marks was too much occupied with his own thoughts to notice the effect of the shock. It was clear to me that what he wanted was to find out how far we had gone in arming ourselves.

I knew that at that time we had less than fifteen hundred rifles and practically no artillery; but I knew also that if this fact got to Kruger's ears, after he had heard of Jameson's incursion, Johannesburg would be instantly attacked and that our whole

plan would go to pieces. My conversation with Sammy Marks ran in this fashion:

"Well, Hammond, it looks as though we were going to have bloodshed."

"I should n't be surprised."

"They say you 've got in 30,000 rifles."

"I don't know how many we 've got, but I don't think it 's as many as that."

"And how about artillery? Is it true you 've got thirty guns?"

"Oh, no! That 's an exaggeration, I 'm sure."

In a few minutes Marks left. I had him trailed, and, as I had foreseen, he went straight off by special train to Kruger. I learned later that he had told the President that we had at least 30,000 rifles and 30 guns!

By the time Marks was on his way to Pretoria the news of Jameson's Raid had spread among the Johannesburg leaders. The situation called for instant action. The secret committee was expanded into a larger body, known as the Reform Committee, which within a few hours included in its membership about seventy-five of the most prominent men on the Rand. The committee published in the *Johannesburg*

Star of Tuesday, December 31, the following notice:

Notice is hereby given that this committee adheres to the National Union Manifesto,[1] and reiterates its desire to maintain the independence of the Republic. The fact that rumors are in course of circulation to the effect that a force [Jameson's] has crossed the Bechuanaland border renders it necessary to take active steps for the defence of Johannesburg and the preservation of order. The committee earnestly desires that the inhabitants should refrain from taking any action which can be considered as an overt act of hostility against the Government.

Our hand had been forced, and our position was critical in the extreme. We had arms for perhaps 1,500 men, but ammunition sufficient only for a few hours' fighting. In face of a Boer attack we should have been helpless. Many of the mines had closed down, and we had to fear serious trouble from the thousands of natives thus suddenly rendered idle. The Government police having left the town in a body, our first task was to organize our own police, so that there should be no dis-

[1] Issued on December 26. It recapitulated our grievances and stated what we wanted. The first demand was for the establishment of the Republic as a true Republic, under a Constitution to be framed by representatives of the whole people.

order. Everyone worked with a will, and by noon on the last day of 1895 we had set on foot all the measures within our power to relieve the situation.

In order to emphasize the true quality of our position, I hoisted a Boer flag over the Goldfields Building, where all the meetings of the committee were held; and we all, then and there, swore allegiance to it.

Events now moved with great rapidity. On the evening of December 31, two delegates from the Boer Government (the so-called Olive Branch Delegation) reached Johannesburg. The first effort of the delegation was to treat with us as individuals. We were, however, well aware of the danger involved in the success of such tactics. It was not in our capacity as individuals that we were assembled, but as a body representative of the Johannesburg people. We insisted on this point, and it was at last yielded by the delegation.

A long conference with the Reform Committee followed. The Boer delegates stated that the Government was prepared to grant us practically every demand of the National Union Manifesto; but, on being pressed for details, they admitted that

Kruger was unalterably opposed to allowing either Roman Catholics or Jews to become voters in the Transvaal.

It was arranged that a deputation of the Reform Committee should go to Pretoria to meet a Government Commission. This plan marked the end of the attempt by the Pretoria authorities to deal with us as individuals, and thus to avoid recognizing the committee as a provisional government, which, in point of fact, it was.

On the evening of December 31, Sir Hercules Robinson — British High Commissioner for South Africa, whose suggestion that he should go to Pretoria as mediator had been accepted by Kruger and by the Reform Committee — issued a Proclamation of which the burden was that Jameson was immediately to retire from the Transvaal, and that all British subjects were to refrain from giving him any countenance or aid in his armed violation of a friendly State. This Proclamation was telegraphed both to Pretoria and to Johannesburg, and copies of it were sent by mounted men to Jameson in the field.

A personal friend of mine, a fellow member of the Reform Committee, Mr. Lace,

went out in company with the man bearing the Proclamation. He has told me that when he informed Jameson of the lack of arms in Johannesburg, Jameson said, "That's all right; I don't need any help from Johannesburg." This conversation was confirmed to me by Jameson the following year in London.

On January 4, 1896, Sir Hercules Robinson reached Pretoria and at once began those negotiations in which, as it seemed to us, he was more anxious to mollify the Boers than to see justice done to the Uitlanders.

In the meantime, on January 2, Jameson's troopers had been surrounded by Boer forces under Commandant Cronje, and had surrendered. The effect of this on the action of the Johannesburgers can be understood only if the reader bears constantly in mind that during the whole of the negotiations between the High Commissioner, the Boer Government, and the Reform Committee *the fact was concealed from us that under the terms of surrender the life of Jameson and of each member of his force was guaranteed.* That this concealment was extended also to the High Commis-

sioner is proved by the following telegram from the High Commissioner, read to us by Sir Jacobus de Wet, the British Diplomatic Agent in Pretoria:

It is urgent that you should inform the people of Johannesburg that I consider that if they lay down their arms they will be acting loyally and honorably, and that if they do not comply with my request they will forfeit all claim to sympathy from Her Majesty's Government and from British subjects throughout the world, *as the lives of Jameson and the prisoners are now practically in their hands.*

In face of such an appeal there was nothing for us to do but to accept the High Commissioner's advice. We therefore gave up our arms and waited anxiously to see what steps Sir Hercules would take to meet a situation which he thus described in a telegram to Mr. Joseph Chamberlain on January 7:

. . . I have just received a message from the Reform Committee resolving to comply with demand of South African Republic to lay down their arms; *the people placing themselves and their interests unreservedly in my hands in fullest confidence that I will see justice done them.* . . .

Our confidence was certainly misplaced.

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On January 8 he telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain: "I will confer with Kruger as to redressing the grievances of the residents of Johannesburg"; and later the same day: "I intend to insist on the fulfilment of promises as regards prisoners and consideration of grievances." On January 14 he left Pretoria for Cape Town; and on the 16th, in reply to an urgent telegram from Mr. Chamberlain about the redress of the Uitlander grievances, he wired, in part, "the question of concessions to Uitlanders was never discussed between us"—*i. e.,* between him and President Kruger.

The Boers were very quick to perceive the indifference of the High Commissioner and to draw their own conclusions from it. On January 8 and 9 sixty-four members of the Reform Committee, including myself, were arrested and taken to the Pretoria jail. On the 26th all were released on bail except Lionel Phillips, George Farrar, Colonel Frank Rhodes, Percy FitzPatrick, and myself. Of the prisoners, twenty-three were Englishmen, sixteen South Africans, nine Scotchmen, six Americans, two Welshmen, two Germans, and one each from Ireland, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Holland, and Turkey.

It would be absurd at the present time to enlarge upon the discomfort and ill-health we suffered through being confined in the heat of summer in an overcrowded and unclean prison hitherto used for Kaffirs. I had a violent recurrence of the dysentery which I had contracted a few months earlier in the Zambesi country; but, through the indefatigable exertions of Mrs. Hammond, I was allowed to live under guard in a cottage at Pretoria; later, on fifty thousand dollars bail, to return to my home in Johannesburg, and, finally, my physical condition having grown steadily worse, to go to the lower altitude and cooler climate of Cape Town.

Our trial was originally set for April 24. As the day drew near and my health showed no signs of improvement, the anxiety of my wife, my friends, and my medical advisers showed itself in their united efforts to induce me to stay where I was, amid the comforts of a seaside home. The American Secretary of State, the late Richard Olney, went so far as to cable the Boer Government on my behalf; but I felt that both on grounds of personal and of national honor I should be in place with the other pris-

oners to face whatever Fate had in store for us.

An incident which greatly added to the fears of my friends was the action of a few irreconcilable Boers who declared their intention of lynching us before we got to court. For this purpose they took to Pretoria a heavy wooden beam from which five Boers had been hanged by the British in 1816! This threat was reported to me by private telegrams from Boer friends of mine in Pretoria.

The trial actually commenced on April 27. Sixty-four of us had been arrested and we were all present when the indictment was read, except one man, who was ill. Our position was a difficult one. A foreign judge had been imported to preside, a man who is reported to have boasted, before he even reached Pretoria, that he would make short work of us. The jury was, of course, made up entirely of Boers. Of our conviction not one of us had the slightest doubt. We were all accused of High Treason, but there were several other counts of a less serious nature. It was very clear to everybody that of the sixty-three prisoners a large number had been followers rather than

leaders. Our first concern was, therefore, to arrange, if it should prove possible, that only those of us who had been generally recognized as the heads of the revolt should incur the risk of the extreme penalty. After a good deal of private discussion between our counsel and the State Attorney, it was agreed that four of us would plead guilty to High Treason and that the other prisoners would be allowed to plead guilty to the minor charges. There was an understanding also that, in view of the pleas, the State Attorney would not urge the Court to inflict exemplary punishment. What the Boers were to gain as a quid pro quo was that all their political dirty linen would not be washed at a long trial which would be reported by every important paper in the world.

The trial lasted only a few hours, and almost till the last moment everything went as well as we could have expected. Dr. Coster, a Hollander, the State Attorney, made his formal address, asking simply that we should be punished according to law. Mr. Wessels, of our counsel, made an eloquent plea in our defense, and took his seat. We all thought that the judge would then

sum up the case for the jury; but, to our consternation, the State Attorney sprang to his feet and claimed the right to address the Court. He then launched into a most violent attack upon us, and demanded that in passing sentence the Court should set aside the comparatively mild Statute Law of the Transvaal and should apply the old Roman-Dutch Law, under which death is the only penalty provided for High Treason. The Court, after hearing this impassioned appeal, adjourned until the following day.

I may borrow from an account written by one of the prisoners, Sir Percy FitzPatrick, the description of the scene in court when the sentences were imposed:

> The usual question as to whether there were any reasons why sentence of death should not be passed upon them having been put and the usual reply in the negative having been received, in the midst of silence that was only disturbed by the breaking down of persons in various parts of the hall — officials, burghers, and the general public — sentence of death was passed, first on Mr. Lionel Phillips, next on Colonel Rhodes, then on Mr. George Farrar, and lastly on Mr. Hammond. The bearing of the four men won for them uni-

versal sympathy and approval, especially under the conditions immediately following the death sentence, when a most painful scene took place in Court. Evidences of feeling came from all parts of the room and from all classes of people: from those who conducted the defence and from the Boers who were to have constituted the jury. The interpreter translating the sentence broke down. Many of the minor officials lost control of themselves, and feelings were further strained by the incident of one man falling insensible.

The other prisoners were sentenced to two years' imprisonment, to a fine of ten thousand dollars each, in default of payment to spend an additional year in jail, and to be banished from the State for three years.

Throughout South Africa, indeed throughout the world, the death sentences were regarded as excessively severe in view of all the circumstances. Petitions, bearing thousands of signatures, were addressed to Kruger from Cape Colony, Natal, and the Orange Free State, while a deputation composed of more than two hundred mayors of South African towns set out for Pretoria for the purpose of appealing in person to the President of the South African Republic.

The first consequence of this agitation was that on May 30 all the prisoners who had not been sentenced to death were offered their liberty if they would sign an appeal for clemency, and pay $10,000 each, an offer which was accepted, except by Mr. Wools-Sampson and Mr. Davies, who refused to sign any appeal. As soon as this matter was out of the way, the Transvaal authorities took up the question of what should be done with the four leaders. The first offer made to us was that we should each pay a fine of $250,000 and write letters to President Kruger thanking him for his magnanimity. These terms we absolutely declined to consider, although the scaffold for our execution had been erected, and all other preparations made with much ostentation.

After a good deal of bargaining we were released on June 11 on payment of $125,000 each *(Kruger having to go without his certificate of magnanimity)* and on our undertaking to keep out of Transvaal politics for fifteen years. Colonel Frank Rhodes refused to make this pledge and accepted instead a sentence of fifteen years' banishment.

So ended the revolt, so far as we Johannesburgers were concerned. Time has amply vindicated our cause.

In 1897 the grievances which had led to the Revolution were still unredressed, and, in consequence, a general financial collapse of the Transvaal was in sight. The Government of the South African Republic, alarmed at the prospect of the mines shutting down and the moneyed element in the country taking its departure, appointed a Commission of Boer officials to inquire into the state of affairs. Its report, after declaring that "the mining industry must be held as the financial basis, support, and mainstay of the State," upheld on almost every point the complaints we had made in our repeated petitions; and suggested remedies. But the Transvaal Legislature rejected these recommendations, and Kruger stigmatized the Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Schalk Burger, a member of the Transvaal Executive Council, as a traitor for having signed the report.

After two years of protracted negotiations with the British Government on the subject of the grievances, Kruger issued an ultimatum to England, and the Boer War

followed. If final proof is sought of the justice of the Uitlanders' cause, it is to be found in the fact that after the Boers had been conquered and their territories brought under the British flag, England immediately granted to the Boers all the civil, political, and religious rights which, in the day of their power, the Boers had denied to British, American, and other nationals. The wisdom of such a policy of fair treatment and equal justice has been made manifest in the Great War, in which, fighting side by side with the British, the Irish, and the Americans, are to be found Boer generals and thousands of Boer volunteers, whose only desire is to uphold the honor of that flag which so recently they had regarded as the emblem of tyranny.

When the Boer War was drawing to a close and the British Government was working out the plan of a general settlement of South African affairs, I happened to be in London. A dinner was given me by my valued friend, the late Earl Grey, who afterwards became Governor-General of Canada. Among the other guests were many of the British Colonial statesmen then gathered in London for the Colonial Con-

ference. In responding to the toast of my health I spoke of the South African situation, and urged the view that only by generous treatment of the vanquished Boers could a South African Commonwealth arise out of the ashes of the conflict. From the warmth with which this opinion was received, and from later conversations with a number of those present, I am encouraged to believe that my voice was not without its share of influence in determining that magnanimous policy which has since welded South Africa into a united Empire.

As I look back after twenty years upon the events I have described, my conscience justifies the part I played in them. Given the same conditions, I would again act as I then acted, and should again be sustained by the firm conviction that I was striving to the best of my ability to maintain and to extend those imperishable principles of fair-play which are in a peculiar sense the heritage of the British Empire and of the United States.

The moral quality of an action cannot, of course, be made to depend upon the effects which flow from it; but it is precisely from such effects that we properly

estimate the wisdom or folly of a political decision.

It is not, therefore, without a good deal of satisfaction that I observe how events have justified the views of the Johannesburg Committee and the decision of the British Government, in 1899, to join issue with President Kruger on the broad question of justice and fair treatment for the whole population of the Transvaal.

The consequences of that view and of that decision were the Boer War and the final establishment of the Union of South Africa as a democratic State within the British Empire.

The debt which the world owes in this matter to the Johannesburg Reformers and to the British Government can be brought home to the reader by stating what would have happened if the Johannesburgers had remained supine under the yoke of Krugerism and England had remained deaf to the cry of her oppressed sons.

Who can doubt that if the Boer War had not broken out in 1899, Germany would have arranged that it should break out in 1914? But reflect what a totally different affair this would have been. In the inter-

vening years Germany had built strategic roads in her South West African territory, as a military threat to the whole British position from Cape Town to the head waters of the Nile.

Recent disclosures enable us to see the vast extent and the infamous nature of Germany's African ambitions. She was to build up an enormous legion of black soldiers, an inexhaustible reservoir of cannon-fodder. With her strategic roads, with her disciplined host of native levies, with the aid of a well-armed, skillful, and courageous Boer army, Germany would have struck a blow in South Africa in 1914 which would have overwhelmed all possible opposition on the part of the British South Africans and the pro-British Boers, and would have given her that world-victory which she so nearly secured by the suddenness of her attack upon Belgium and France.

Her treasury would have been replenished with the gold of South Africa; naval bases at Durban and Cape Town would have placed her submarines within easy striking distance of every sea route south of the equator; the resources of the South

American Continent would no longer have been at the disposal of her enemies; the participation of India and Australia in the war would have been seriously hampered.

It is not too much to say, then, that the Boer War, by removing the possibility of a formidable German military and naval base in what is now the Union of South Africa, contributed in no small measure to the approaching German defeat which is to rescue the world from a Teuton overlordship.

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